Post by arfanho7 on Feb 22, 2024 3:58:07 GMT -5
It is aimed at facilitating communication and collaboration between practitioners and academics by introducing key vocabulary and concepts used in rigorous impact evaluation methods starting with randomized controlled trials and comparing them with other methods ranging from simple pre post analysis to difference in differences matching estimations and regression discontinuity designs.
Download working paper hbs.edu faculty Pages item.aspx num Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry By Schmidt William and Ryan W. Buell ABSTRACT—Operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm s prospects to less informed parties such as investors customers America Cell Phone Number List competitors and regulators. Consequently managers in these settings often face a tradeoff between making an optimal decision and sending a favorable signal. We provide experimental evidence on the choices made by decision makers in such settings.
Equilibrium assumptions that are commonly applied to analyze these situations yield the least cost separating outcome as the unique equilibrium. undertakes a costly signal to resolve the information asymmetry that exists. We provide evidence however that participants are much more likely to pursue a pooling outcome when such an outcome is available. This result is important for research and practice because pooling and separating outcomes can yield dramatically different results and have divergent implications. We find evidence that the choice to pool is influenced by changes in the underlying newsvendor model parameters in our setting.
Download working paper hbs.edu faculty Pages item.aspx num Experimental Evidence of Pooling Outcomes Under Information Asymmetry By Schmidt William and Ryan W. Buell ABSTRACT—Operational decisions under information asymmetry can signal a firm s prospects to less informed parties such as investors customers America Cell Phone Number List competitors and regulators. Consequently managers in these settings often face a tradeoff between making an optimal decision and sending a favorable signal. We provide experimental evidence on the choices made by decision makers in such settings.
Equilibrium assumptions that are commonly applied to analyze these situations yield the least cost separating outcome as the unique equilibrium. undertakes a costly signal to resolve the information asymmetry that exists. We provide evidence however that participants are much more likely to pursue a pooling outcome when such an outcome is available. This result is important for research and practice because pooling and separating outcomes can yield dramatically different results and have divergent implications. We find evidence that the choice to pool is influenced by changes in the underlying newsvendor model parameters in our setting.